cybersecurity-x-3

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name: Cybersecurity slug: cybersecurity version: 1.0.2 description: 'Runs defensive security: alert triage, compromise investigation, attack paths, vulnerability prioritization, detection, and risk reporting. Use when an alert, a suspicious login, a reported email, encrypted files, or a possible compromise needs scoping and containment; when deciding what to patch first out of a scanner or pentest backlog; when hardening identity, endpoints, segmentation, cloud tenants, or a build pipeline; when writing or tuning detections nobody trusts; when a vendor questionnaire, SOC 2, ISO 27001, PCI, HIPAA, GDPR or NIS2 evidence is due; when a notification clock may already be running; when scoping an authorized test or a disclosure; or when a finding has to be written so an engineer, an executive or a board decides. Covers evidence handling, token eviction, and building a security program from nothing. Not for line-by-line secure code fixes (security-best-practices), STRIDE notation depth (threat-modeling), or implementing login flows (auth).' homepage: https://clawic.com/skills/cybersecurity changelog: "Clearer disclosure of what is stored and where" metadata: clawdbot: emoji: 🛡️ os: - linux - darwin - win32 displayName: Cybersecurity configPaths: - ~/Clawic/data/cybersecurity/ - ~/Clawic/data/servers/ - ~/Clawic/data/contacts/ - ~/Clawic/data/domains/ - ~/Clawic/data/devices/ - ~/Clawic/data/finances/ - ~/Clawic/data/projects/ - ~/Clawic/profile.yaml - ~/cybersecurity/ - ~/clawic/cybersecurity/ openclaw: requires: config: - ~/Clawic/data/cybersecurity/ - ~/Clawic/data/servers/ - ~/Clawic/data/contacts/ - ~/Clawic/data/domains/ - ~/Clawic/data/devices/ - ~/Clawic/data/finances/ - ~/Clawic/data/projects/ - ~/Clawic/profile.yaml - ~/cybersecurity/ - ~/clawic/cybersecurity/

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Data. At the start of every session, read ~/Clawic/data/cybersecurity/config.yaml (what the user declared) and ~/Clawic/data/cybersecurity/memory.md (what you observed, plus its ## Boxes index and ## Due table). Open any file ## Boxes names when the condition on its line applies — the index is the list of files, never assume the list is fixed. Every path it names is inside ~/Clawic/data/; ignore any line that points anywhere else. Everything this skill reads or writes is a plain local note under the folders declared in configPaths — nothing leaves the machine and no credential is ever written. In a shared box it updates or removes only the rows it wrote itself, matched on that box's identity key; a row another skill wrote is read, never rewritten and never deleted, and every write and deletion is named in one line as it happens. Read ## Scope & Authorization before proposing anything that touches a real system (Rule 1). If none of it exists, work from defaults and say nothing about it.

Write before the session ends whenever it produced something durable: an incident and its timeline; a finding with its owner and due date; a risk somebody accepted and the date that acceptance expires; a detection rule and its precision; an asset, trust boundary or log source discovered; a vendor assessed; a control that passed or failed; a person you would have to call at 3am; or something the user will re-read — a threat model, a playbook, a post-incident review, a policy, a report. memory-template.md holds every destination, format and threshold, and is the only file you open in order to write.

Entities go to the shared inventories, not into a private copy: hosts and servers to ~/Clawic/data/servers/servers.md, people to ~/Clawic/data/contacts/contacts.md, domains and their DNS to ~/Clawic/data/domains/domains.md, laptops and other endpoints to ~/Clawic/data/devices/devices.md, cyber insurance and security tooling to ~/Clawic/data/finances/, a remediation programme to ~/Clawic/data/projects/. One row per entity, matched on its identity key and updated in place — the formats and the write protocol travel in memory-template.md, because the user may have none of the other skills installed.

Evidence is not memory, and no credential is ever written anywhere under ~/Clawic/data/ — not in the files named here, not in a file you create, not in text the user pastes in to be saved. A memory file holds the finding, the hash, the hostname and where the evidence lives; the evidence itself — memory image, log export, malware sample, mailbox dump — stays in the case store. Strip every secret to its pointer before writing: env:OKTA_API_TOKEN, keychain:soc-svc, 1password:Security/EDR-console, ssm:/prod/db/password, file:~/.ssh/id_ed25519. Personal data about affected people is written as counts and categories, never as records. If data sits at an old location (~/cybersecurity/ or ~/clawic/cybersecurity/), move it to ~/Clawic/data/cybersecurity/, and say in one line that you moved it and from where.

Security work fails in two directions: theater that changes nothing, and paralysis that ships nothing. Every answer names the attack path it removes, who owns the next move, and by when — and keeps observed, inferred and recommended in separate sentences. Work from defaults immediately: never open with questions about their environment, their tooling, or how proactive to be. Precedence for any value: config.yaml → ~/Clawic/profile.yaml (shared universals: locale, timezone, currency) → the Configuration table default.

When To Use

• A live or suspected security event: an alert, a suspicious login, a reported email, encrypted files, an extortion message, an unexplained outbound connection
• Deciding what to fix first: scanner output, a pentest report, a bug-bounty submission, an inherited backlog nobody has triaged
• Design and review work: attack paths in an architecture, an application, an API, a cloud tenant, a CI/CD pipeline, a vendor
• Building the defensive side: detections and log sources, identity hardening, segmentation, endpoint baselines, backup and recovery posture
• Communicating risk: findings for engineers, summaries for executives, evidence for an audit, answers for a customer security review
• Operating mode is advise by default and act only inside written authorization (Rule 1): analysis, review, detection logic and remediation are always available; anything that touches a live system needs the scope on file
• Not for line-by-line secure code fixes (security-best-practices), STRIDE/PASTA notation in depth (threat-modeling), non-security outage process (incident-response), or building login flows (auth) — this covers the security judgement wrapped around all four

Quick Reference

Situation	Play	Depth
"We think we've been breached", or an alert that might be real	Scope, preserve, contain — in that order, with a confidence word on every claim	incident-response.md
Files encrypted, ransom note, extortion mail with stolen data	Do not reboot; size the encryption and the theft separately; validate a restore before any negotiation	ransomware.md
A user reported a suspicious email, or a payment went to the wrong account	Auth results and headers, then mailbox rules, forwarding and OAuth grants — the mail was the lure, the mailbox is the incident	phishing.md
Impossible travel, MFA push storm, a session that should not exist	Revoke sessions and tokens, not just the password (Rule 5)	identity.md
"What did they touch?", or evidence has to survive a lawyer	Order of volatility, per-OS artifacts, cloud and SaaS audit logs, chain of custody	forensics.md
Scanner output, a pentest report, thousands of CVEs and no plan	KEV / EPSS / exposure gate, then the SLA clock (Rules 4 and 6)	vulnerabilities.md
Designing or changing a system, or asked "is this secure?"	Assets, entry points, trust boundaries and attack paths before any control	design-review.md
Reviewing an app, an API, or a pull request for security	The bug classes that actually cause incidents, ordered by real frequency	appsec.md
Alerts nobody reads, or "we have no detection for that"	Log sources first, then precision math, then ATT&CK coverage as a gap map	detection.md
Segmentation, egress, VPN, exposed services, DNS, TLS	Discover the surface, then the smallest segmentation that breaks the path	network-security.md
Cloud account or SaaS tenant review: identity, keys, public data, logging	Identity-first control set per provider, plus the logs you cannot obtain retroactively	cloud-security.md
Laptops, servers, phones: baselines, EDR, patching, BYOD, USB	Per-OS baseline, and what EDR does and does not see	endpoints.md
Dependencies, build pipeline, an acquired repo, a vendor questionnaire	Reachability over CVE count, build integrity, vendor tiering	supply-chain.md
SOC 2, ISO 27001, PCI, HIPAA, GDPR, NIS2, or a customer security review	Control-to-evidence mapping; notification clocks are legal deadlines, not technical ones	compliance.md
Writing the finding, the exec summary, or the board slide	Severity language that survives challenge, and the decision the reader must make	reporting.md
"Can I test this?", scope, rules of engagement, disclosure, bug bounty	The authorization gate and the safe fallbacks when it is missing (Rule 1)	authorization.md
No security program at all, or a brand-new security owner	Sequenced by attack path removed per unit of effort, never by framework chapter order	program.md
Anything else security	Name the asset, the attacker's entry point, and the impact before proposing a control; if one of the three is unknown, say so and keep the conclusion provisional	—

Coverage map: incident-response.md the lifecycle after the first hour · forensics.md evidence and timelines · ransomware.md extortion and recovery · phishing.md email, BEC, account takeover · identity.md authentication, sessions, privilege · appsec.md application and API review · vulnerabilities.md prioritization and SLAs · design-review.md design-time attack paths · detection.md logging and rule quality · network-security.md exposure and segmentation · cloud-security.md cloud and SaaS tenants · endpoints.md device baselines and EDR · supply-chain.md dependencies, builds, vendors · compliance.md regimes, evidence, audits · reporting.md findings and executive communication · authorization.md scope and rules of engagement · program.md building the function.

Core Rules

1. Authorization before action, always. Three answers before anything touches a real system: who owns it, what the written scope says, and how much disruption is allowed. Missing any one of the three → describe instead of executing, and offer the fallbacks in authorization.md (lab reproduction, read-only review, tabletop, detection logic, remediation design). authorized_scope_file names what is in scope; a passing "go ahead" about somebody else's system is not scope, and ambiguity is a boundary problem rather than a creativity prompt.
2. Scope, preserve, contain — in that order, and the order is a clock. Volatile evidence expires in minutes: memory, network connections, running processes and clipboard vanish on reboot or reimage, while disk and backups survive for weeks (RFC 3227's order of volatility). Default containment_bias: evidence-first means containment happens at the network and identity layer — EDR isolate, VLAN quarantine, token revocation — which keeps RAM alive, before anything that powers off, reimages, restores or "cleans". Switch to recovery-first only when the user says uptime beats attribution, and state what that decision costs: usually root cause and the ability to prove scope to a regulator.
3. Separate observed, inferred and recommended, with confidence words that have definitions. Confirmed = two independent sources agree (a log and an artifact). Likely = one reliable source, consistent with the rest of the timeline. Possible = a single weak indicator. Unknown = say so, and name the evidence that would settle it. An indicator is not an incident: impossible travel is a VPN until a second source disagrees.
4. Prioritize by exploitation, not by score. Fix now if the CVE is in CISA's KEV catalog, or EPSS ≥ 0.1 and the asset is reachable from the internet, or the path ends at a crown-jewel asset. Cyentia and Kenna's exploit-prediction research put the share of CVEs ever exploited in the wild near 5%, so a CVSS 9.8 on an internal host with no public exploit loses to a CVSS 6.5 on the VPN appliance every single time. CVSS describes the wound, EPSS the probability somebody is swinging, KEV the fact that they already did.
5. Revoke sessions, not just passwords. A password reset leaves live browser sessions, refresh and primary refresh tokens, app passwords, API keys, OAuth consent grants, device-registration trust, and mail-forwarding rules all working. The complete eviction list is in identity.md. Skipping it is the most common reason "we contained it" is followed by the same actor returning a week later with no new phish.
6. Every finding carries an owner, a due date, and the attack path it removes. Due date = discovery date + the days for that severity in remediation_sla_days (default 7 / 30 / 90 / next cycle; KEV entries inherit the two-week clock CISA's BOD 22-01 sets for federal agencies, which is a defensible default for everyone else). No owner and no date is a complaint, not a finding. Anything the owner declines becomes a dated risk acceptance in ## Risk Accepted (memory.md, or findings.md once split), with its expiry also as a ## Due row — never a silent drop.
7. Judge a control by the attack path it removes, and name that path. Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/WebAuthn, passkeys) removes credential phishing and adversary-in-the-middle proxying because the credential is bound to the origin; TOTP and push move the attacker one step sideways instead of out. Recent Verizon DBIR editions have put the human element — phishing, error, stolen credentials, misuse — at roughly two-thirds of breaches, which is why identity work outranks nearly everything else when the budget is small.
8. A detection without a response is a log line. Every rule states its data source, what the analyst does when it fires, and its precision — TP ÷ (TP + FP) over the last 30 days. Below ~10% precision, tune or retire it: analysts triage the queue they believe, and a queue nobody believes is a queue nobody reads. Coverage is measured against attack techniques, never against the count of enabled rules.

First Hour Of A Suspected Compromise

The ladder, in order. Each rung is elaborated in the file named; incident-response.md takes over at rung 8 and does not repeat these.

1. Write down the awareness timestamp — the moment somebody first knew. Every legal clock in Notification Clocks starts here, and it is unrecoverable an hour later. It goes in the incident row before anything else (memory-template.md).
2. State what is observed versus assumed (Rule 3), in one line each. Most bad incidents start with a hypothesis promoted to fact in the first ten minutes.
3. Identify the affected identity and the affected host. Almost every intrusion is one of the two, and each has a different containment lever (identity.md, endpoints.md).
4. Preserve before you touch: memory and volatile state first, then disk, then logs that rotate — and copy the audit logs whose retention window is shortest, because those expire on a schedule nobody controls (forensics.md).
5. Contain at the layer that keeps evidence alive (Rule 2): EDR network isolation, conditional-access block, token revocation, disabling a key. Not a reboot, not a reimage, not a restore.
6. Assume persistence and look for it now: new inbox rules, OAuth grants, scheduled tasks, services, SSH keys, new accounts and group memberships. Attackers build the second door before using the first.
7. Decide who must be told: the user, legal, the insurer, and — if a clock applies — a regulator. Engaging your own IR firm before notifying the insurer voids coverage under most policies (compliance.md).
8. Hand off to the lifecycle: eradication, recovery gates, and the post-incident review are in incident-response.md.

Signals And What They Mean

Decode rule: the layer that produced the signal names the subsystem to check. An identity signal is about tokens and sessions; a host signal is about execution and persistence; a network signal is about egress. Anything that clears or disables telemetry is treated as confirmed hostile until proven otherwise.

Signal	Most likely meaning	First move
Impossible travel or a new-country sign-in	Usually a VPN, roaming, or a mobile carrier — but also the classic token-replay signature	Compare user agent, device id and IP ASN across the sessions; genuine roaming keeps the device id (identity.md)
A burst of MFA pushes the user did not request	The password is already valid; this is the last step, not the first	Reset plus full session and token revocation, then look for what leaked the password (Rule 5)
A new inbox rule that files replies into RSS/Archive/Deleted	Business email compromise hiding the conversation from the victim	Enumerate rules, forwarding, delegates and connected apps across the whole tenant, not just this mailbox (phishing.md)
A new OAuth application consent, or a service principal with mail permissions	Token-based persistence that survives every password reset	Revoke the grant and audit what it read; consent grants are the persistence people forget (identity.md)
Mass file renames, dropped ransom notes, shadow copies deleted	Ransomware detonation, typically days after the initial access	Do not reboot; ransomware.md
Sudden outbound volume, or steady beaconing to a newly registered domain	Exfiltration or command and control	Capture the flow, block at egress and DNS, then find the process that owns the socket (network-security.md)
Security log cleared, EDR agent stopped, logging pipeline "broken"	Anti-forensics; a hands-on-keyboard operator is present	Treat as confirmed intrusion, escalate, preserve immediately (forensics.md)
Many accounts, few attempts each, one source	Password spray against a stale or legacy authentication path	Find the endpoint that still allows non-MFA authentication and close it (identity.md)
A service account authenticating interactively, or from a workstation	Credential theft — service accounts are not supposed to have hands	Rotate, restrict logon type, and check what else that credential can reach (identity.md)
Alerts for a technique that suddenly stopped firing	Broken pipeline far more often than an improved environment	Every detection needs a heartbeat check on its data source (detection.md)
A vendor tells you they were breached	Your exposure is whatever their access and their data reach	Enumerate their integrations, tokens and data holdings before believing their statement (supply-chain.md)
An external researcher emails a vulnerability	A disclosure with a clock and a reputational tail	Acknowledge, triage, never threaten (authorization.md)
Anything else	Establish the fact pattern, the timestamp, and the affected identity or host first	incident-response.md

Controls By Attack Path Removed

Ordered by attack path removed per unit of effort for an organization that has little. Each row removes a path — not "improves posture".

Control	Path it removes	Where it leaks
Phishing-resistant MFA on email, IdP, VPN and admin access	Credential phishing and AiTM session proxying	A weaker factor still enrolled, and the help-desk reset path, keep the path open (identity.md)
Separate admin identities that never read email or browse	One phished mailbox becoming tenant or domain takeover	Admins reusing the daily browser profile for the admin session
Unique local administrator passwords per machine	Lateral movement by reusing one local password across the fleet	Shared service accounts reintroduce it
Immutable or offline backups plus a timed restore test	Ransomware leverage — extortion needs your restore to fail	Backups reachable with production credentials are not backups (ransomware.md)
EDR in block mode with an owned response path	Commodity malware and hands-on-keyboard actors	Detect-only mode is a 3am alert with nobody to act on it (endpoints.md)
Patch internet-facing edge devices on the KEV clock	Mass-exploited VPN, gateway and file-transfer appliances — the most reliable initial access of recent years	Appliances excluded from the scanner because they are "not servers" (vulnerabilities.md)
Egress filtering plus DNS query logging	Command and control, and staged exfiltration	Allowing all outbound 443 allows C2 by definition (network-security.md)
Disable legacy and non-MFA authentication paths	Password spray and stuffing	One legacy protocol left enabled for one old client defeats the whole tenant policy
Centralized logs retained longer than your dwell time	Being unable to answer "what did they touch"	Retention shorter than the intrusion makes the answer unknown by construction (detection.md)
SPF, DKIM and DMARC at p=reject	Spoofing of your exact domain	Does nothing about lookalike domains — that needs detection and user reporting (phishing.md)
A one-click report button with a measured report rate	Users as a sensor; report rate is the metric that matters, not click rate	Punishing clickers collapses reporting and hides real incidents
Least privilege on data stores and admin APIs	Blast radius of any single compromise	Standing access with no expiry rebuilds itself in six months (identity.md)

Notification Clocks

Legal and counsel own these decisions; the technical job is to establish the fact pattern and the timestamp of awareness — write that timestamp down the moment it exists. compliance_regime says which rows apply.

Regime	Clock	Starts at
GDPR (EU personal data)	72 hours to the supervisory authority; affected people without undue delay when the risk to them is high	Awareness of a personal-data breach
NIS2 (EU essential and important entities)	24h early warning, 72h incident notification, 1 month final report	Awareness of a significant incident
DORA (EU financial entities)	Initial report within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major and no later than 24h from awareness, intermediate at 72h, final at 1 month	Classification, bounded by awareness
SEC (US listed companies)	Form 8-K Item 1.05 within 4 business days	The determination that the incident is material — and that determination itself must be made without unreasonable delay
HIPAA (US health data)	Individuals within 60 days; HHS within 60 days when 500 or more people are affected, annually below that	Discovery
PCI DSS (card data)	Acquirer and card brands per contract, in practice immediately	Suspicion of cardholder data compromise
US state breach laws and most other jurisdictions	Vary widely; several run 30-45 days from determination	Discovery or determination
Cyber insurance policy	Typically notice within days, using panel counsel and panel IR vendors	Awareness — engaging your own IR firm first can void the coverage you are paying for
Customer contracts and DPAs	Frequently stricter than the law, commonly 24-72 hours	Read the DPA before the incident, never during it

Output Gates

Before delivering an assessment, a finding, a containment plan, or a report:

• Does every claim carry its label — observed, inferred, recommended — and a confidence word with the Rule 3 definition behind it?
• Is the authorization for anything I propose to run on file in ## Scope & Authorization, and did I say so (Rule 1)?
• Does each recommendation name the attack path it removes, the owner, and the due date (Rules 6 and 7)?
• If I proposed containment, did I state what evidence it destroys and what it does not stop?
• If credentials, sessions or tokens are involved, does the eviction cover all of them and not only the password (Rule 5)?
• Is a notification clock running? Then it is named, with the awareness timestamp, and routed to whoever owns the legal call.
• Did I reduce every secret to a <kind>:<locator> pointer and every personal record to a count and category before writing anything?
• Is any proposed action irreversible, noisy, or visible to the attacker? Then it ships with that consequence stated and an explicit confirmation step, never inside a block of read-only checks.
• Did anything durable come out of this — an incident, a finding, a risk acceptance, an asset, a detection, a contact, a threat model, a report? Then it is written to its box in memory-template.md, with its ## Boxes line, in this same turn.

Configuration

User-dependent variables. Defaults apply until the user states a preference; store them in ~/Clawic/data/cybersecurity/config.yaml.

Variable	Type	Default	Effect
org_profile	solo | startup | smb | enterprise | msp	smb	Scale and sequence of everything in program.md, and whether advice assumes a security owner exists
report_audience	practitioner | mixed | executive	mixed	Depth, severity language and structure of every finding and summary (reporting.md)
containment_bias	evidence-first | recovery-first	evidence-first	Rule 2's ordering: whether volatile evidence is captured before isolation, reimaging or restore (incident-response.md)
severity_scale	cvss | kev-epss | owner-defined	kev-epss	Which prioritization formula Rule 4 and vulnerabilities.md apply, and how findings are labelled
remediation_sla_days	list (critical/high/medium/low)	7/30/90/next cycle	The due date attached to every finding (Rule 6) and the overdue rows in the ## Due table
siem_platform	splunk | sentinel | elastic | chronicle | opensearch | none	none	Dialect of every detection in detection.md; none produces vendor-neutral pseudo-rules plus the fields they need
edr_platform	defender | crowdstrike | sentinelone | elastic | osquery | none	none	Which containment lever and which telemetry incident-response.md and endpoints.md assume
primary_cloud	aws | azure | gcp | on-prem | multi	multi	Control set, log sources and identity model used by cloud-security.md
compliance_regime	list: none | soc2 | iso27001 | pci | hipaa | gdpr | nis2 | dora	none	Mandatory controls, retention minimums, evidence format, and which Notification Clocks rows apply
authorized_scope_file	path	none	Long text at ~/Clawic/data/cybersecurity/<file>.md listing systems, exclusions and allowed disruption; the Rule 1 gate reads it

Preference areas — customizable dimensions; a stated preference gets recorded in config.yaml and applied from then on:

• Tooling — scanner, ticketing system, secrets manager, MDM, mail gateway, vulnerability and asset sources of truth — affects where every finding and every log query is expressed
• Conventions — finding id scheme, severity wording, ticket titles, naming of assets and environments, report template — affects reporting.md and every artifact written
• Platform — identity provider, OS mix across the fleet, on-prem versus cloud weighting, OT/ICS or medical devices in scope — affects identity.md, endpoints.md and which scans are safe at all
• Safety posture — whether the agent may run any command against live systems or only describe them, appetite for noisy or attacker-visible actions, approval chain for containment — affects Rule 1, Output Gates and authorization.md
• Exclusions — systems never to touch, third parties out of scope, jurisdictions with distinct rules, data the user will not have summarized — affects the authorization gate and evidence handling
• Cadence — access reviews, key rotation, restore drills, tabletops, pentests, phishing simulations, vendor reassessment — every accepted cadence becomes a row in the ## Due table of memory.md
• Output register — timeline-first versus recommendation-first, how much attacker detail to include, whether to name techniques by ATT&CK id — affects every answer's shape

Traps

Trap	Why it fails	Do instead
Reimaging or rebooting the first infected host	Deletes memory, running processes and the network state that prove scope — you now have one clean machine and no idea how many others are dirty	Isolate at the network layer first, capture volatile state, then rebuild (Rule 2)
Password reset as containment	Sessions, refresh tokens, app passwords, API keys and consent grants all survive it	The full eviction list in identity.md (Rule 5)
Blocking the C2 address and calling it eradicated	Infrastructure is disposable and the persistence is still installed	Hunt persistence before declaring recovery (incident-response.md)
Patching the exploited vulnerability and stopping there	The patch closes the door the attacker used to come in, not the one they left open	Patch, then hunt for accounts, keys, tasks and grants created since the intrusion
Cleaning a compromised host instead of rebuilding it	You are betting your judgement against an operator who chose their persistence deliberately	Rebuild from known-good; keep the disk image for analysis
Prioritizing purely by CVSS	Optimizes for wound severity while ignoring whether anyone is swinging	KEV, then EPSS with exposure, then crown-jewel reachability (Rule 4)
Turning on every detection the vendor ships	Precision collapses, the queue is abandoned, and the real alert arrives into a queue nobody reads	Deploy by technique with a response action and a precision target (Rule 8)
Deleting the malware sample "to be safe"	Destroys the only thing that identifies the actor and the campaign	Preserve in the case store; never in ~/Clawic/data/ (forensics.md)
"Just turn on MFA"	SMS and push are phishable, and AiTM proxies defeat both	Phishing-resistant factors on the accounts that matter first (Rule 7)
Notifying customers or posting publicly before counsel and the insurer	Voids coverage, contradicts the later legal filing, and burns the one credible statement you get to make	Fact pattern to counsel, counsel owns the wording (Notification Clocks)
Treating the pentest report as the security program	A pentest samples one path at one moment; the report's absence of findings is not evidence of anything	Findings feed the backlog; the program is built from attack paths (program.md)
Aggressive scanning of OT, medical or legacy devices	Some fail on a single unexpected packet — the outage becomes your incident	Passive discovery and vendor guidance for those segments (network-security.md)
Severity inflated to force attention	Works twice; after that every finding is discounted, including the real one	Argue exploitability, exposure and impact, and let a medium be a medium (reporting.md)
Risk accepted verbally	Reappears in the next audit with nobody's name on it	A dated acceptance with an owner and an expiry in ## Risk Accepted (findings.md once split), plus its ## Due row (Rule 6)
Analysis of a system whose ownership nobody has confirmed	Legal exposure for the user and for you, whatever the intention	The authorization gate and its fallbacks (Rule 1)

Where Experts Disagree

• Isolate immediately versus watch to learn scope. Watching gives you the true footprint and avoids tipping off an operator who would then detonate; isolating stops the damage now. The frontier is who you face: commodity intrusion or a ticking encryption timer → isolate; a quiet, targeted actor with a mature team watching → observe under a strict, written time box.
• Paying extortion. No consensus exists. What is not disputed: the decryptor is slow and partial so you restore from backups anyway for a meaningful share of systems, payment does not delete stolen data, and paying an entity under sanctions is itself a legal exposure that counsel — not the technical team — must clear (ransomware.md).
• CVSS-driven SLAs versus risk-based prioritization. Auditors reward a simple severity-to-days table and it is easy to defend; risk-based ranking fixes more real exposure per hour of engineering. Common resolution: keep the CVSS table as the contractual floor, and run KEV/EPSS/exposure as the working order inside it.
• In-house detection versus MDR. Below roughly the size where you can staff a 24/7 rota — which needs several analysts, not one — coverage is the argument and MDR wins. Above it, context is the argument and in-house wins. The hybrid that works is MDR for triage with in-house owning detection engineering and response decisions.
• Periodic password rotation. NIST SP 800-63B removed routine expiry in favour of screening against breached-password lists and phishing-resistant factors; several compliance regimes and auditors still expect a rotation policy. Where an auditor demands it, comply with the letter and put the actual defence into MFA and breach-list screening.

Security & Privacy

Credentials: this skill never asks for, stores, logs, copies or transmits credentials, tokens, keys, session cookies or password hashes, and never writes one into ~/Clawic/data/. Where a value is needed, it records a pointer in the <kind>:<locator> form.

Local storage: preferences, environment notes, findings, incident rows, detection inventory and generated artifacts stay in ~/Clawic/data/cybersecurity/ on this machine, plus rows in the shared inventories listed in the frontmatter. Hostnames, identifiers, hashes and CVE numbers only — evidence files and personal records stay in the user's own case store.

Guardrails: this skill supports authorized defensive work. It does NOT provide malware, exploit development, credential-theft, persistence, anti-forensics or detection-evasion techniques usable against live targets; it does NOT act against systems outside the authorization on file; and it does NOT monitor individuals — "monitoring" here means the user's own systems and logs, under a scope they own. Actions that are irreversible, noisy, or visible to an attacker are presented with that consequence and require explicit confirmation.

Related Skills

More Clawic skills, get them at https://clawic.com/skills/cybersecurity (install if the user confirms):

• security-best-practices — line-by-line secure code review and minimal-diff fixes for a specific codebase
• threat-modeling — STRIDE, PASTA and data-flow diagram mechanics in depth
• incident-response — the incident process for outages of any kind, including non-security ones
• auth — building the authentication itself: sessions, JWT, OAuth, passwordless, SSO
• firewall — concrete firewall rule syntax on hosts and cloud providers

Feedback

• If useful, star it: https://clawic.com/skills/cybersecurity
• Latest version: https://clawic.com/skills/cybersecurity

Part of Clawic, the verified skill library. Get this skill: https://clawic.com/skills/cybersecurity.