原始内容
pi-nolo
No-YOLO mode for pi-coding-agent. Gates write, edit, and bash tool calls behind user confirmation — press Enter to allow, Escape to block.
Read-safe bash commands (ls, grep, git status, etc.) are auto-approved via a configurable allowlist, so you only get prompted for commands that could mutate state.
Install
pi install npm:pi-nolo
Or from git:
pi install https://github.com/burneikis/pi-nolo
Note:
The default YOLO-cycle shortcut is ctrl+y, which conflicts with pi's built-in tui.editor.yank. Instead of editing pi's keybindings.json, you can move the extension's shortcut by setting "shortcut": "ctrl+shift+y" in your nolo.json (see Configuration). Changing it takes effect after a /reload.
What it does
Every time the agent tries to:
- Write a file — confirms with the file path and line count
- Edit a file — confirms with the file path; shows a pre-rendered diff preview before the tool finishes executing
- Run a bash command — auto-approves safe read-only commands; confirms everything else
You get a dialog: Enter to allow, Escape to block.
In non-interactive mode (no UI, e.g. pi -p or --mode json) nothing is gated by default, since there is no way to confirm. Enable strict non-interactive mode to instantly block anything that would have required confirmation instead:
- Config: set
"strictNonInteractive": trueinnolo.json(project overrides global). - Env var:
NOLO_STRICT=1(ortrue) enables it,NOLO_STRICT=0disables it; the env var overrides config.
With strict mode on, write/edit calls and non-read-only bash commands are blocked with a clear reason; safe read-only bash commands still run. Example:
NOLO_STRICT=1 pi -p "Review the code in src/"
Pre-rendered edit diffs
As of pi ~0.63.0, the built-in edit tool only shows diffs after execution. This extension includes a built-in pre-renderer (ported from pi-pre-render-edit) that computes and displays the diff as soon as the tool arguments are complete -- before the edit is applied. This means you can see exactly what will change while the confirmation dialog is open.
If you previously installed pi-pre-render-edit separately, you can remove it -- the functionality is now bundled here.
YOLO modes
Use /yolo to cycle through three modes at any time during a session:
| Mode | Footer label | Write/Edit | Bash |
|---|---|---|---|
off (default) |
nolo |
confirm | confirm (safe cmds auto-approved) |
writes |
writes |
auto-allow | confirm (safe cmds auto-approved) |
full |
yolo |
auto-allow | auto-allow |
Each /yolo invocation advances to the next mode and wraps back around:
off → writes-yolo → full-yolo → off → …
The current mode is shown in the footer status bar. It is also persisted in the session so it survives a /reload.
When to use each mode
writes— you trust the edits but still want a gate on shell commands.full— you want the agent to run completely hands-free. Use with caution.
Scope writes to the project root
In writes mode, write/edit calls are normally auto-approved anywhere on disk. Scope-writes narrows this: when on, writes mode still confirms any write/edit whose path resolves outside the project root (cwd), so the agent can't silently edit files elsewhere. off and full modes are unaffected.
- Config default: set
"defaultScopeWrites": trueinnolo.json(project overrides global overrides the built-in default offalse). - Toggle live: run
/scopewritesat any time during a session to flip it. The choice is persisted in the session so it survives a/reload.
| scope-writes | writes mode write inside root |
writes mode write outside root |
|---|---|---|
| off (default) | auto-allow | auto-allow |
| on | auto-allow | confirm |
Bash Command Allowlist
Safe commands are auto-approved without a confirmation dialog. A command is considered safe when:
- Every shell segment starts with a recognized safe prefix (e.g.,
ls,grep,git status) - It does not contain dangerous constructs, flags, redirects, or mutation forms
- Any command substitution is recursively safe and is not supplying an opaque argument to a command whose flags can write or execute
Default safe prefixes
cd, ls, cat, head, tail, wc, find, grep, rg, fd, tree,
file, stat, du, df, which, whoami, pwd, echo, date, uname,
printenv, basename, dirname, realpath, readlink, id, hostname,
md5sum, sha256sum, git status, git log, git diff, git show,
git blame, git ls-files, git branch, git remote, git tag,
git rev-parse, npm list, npm outdated, npm view, node --version,
python --version, cargo --version, rustc --version, go version,
sed, true, false, :, sort, uniq, cut, tr, jq, column, paste,
comm, diff, less, more
sed
sed is allowlisted but gated behind a strict read-only script grammar rather than a flag blacklist, because its script language can write files (w, W, s///w) and run commands (e, s///e) even without -i. A sed segment auto-approves only when every script (positional or via -e/--expression) consists of numeric or $ (last-line) addresses with the p, d, =, or q commands, and every flag is from the read-only set (-n, -u, -z, -s, -E, -r and their long forms). So sed -n '2400,2480p' file and sed 10q file auto-approve, while sed -i, -f, s///, w/e commands, regex addresses, backslash escapes, and options appearing after filenames (GNU sed permutes arguments) all prompt.
Dangerous pattern guard
Even if a command starts with a safe prefix, it will still require confirmation if it contains:
- Backtick command substitution (
`) $()command substitution whose inner command is not itself safe- Redirections (
>,>>) - Dangerous commands (
rm,sudo,eval,exec,source,sh,bash)
For example, ls is auto-approved but ls; rm -rf / will prompt for confirmation.
Variable assignments
Standalone assignments with literal values are treated as safe segments, and $NAME / ${NAME} references to them are expanded before prefix matching. So D=/some/dir; $D/tool.sh is judged exactly like /some/dir/tool.sh. Values containing quotes or spaces are not recognized as assignments, and unknown variables are never expanded (such commands fall through to confirmation).
cd tracking
cd <literal-dir> targets are tracked so that a following relative command word (./x, ../x) can be resolved to an absolute path before prefix matching: cd /skills/phab/scripts && ./tool.sh is judged exactly like /skills/phab/scripts/tool.sh. The tracked directory always survives && boundaries, where the shell guarantees the cd succeeded in the main shell. It also survives ; and bare-newline boundaries when the target directory is verified to exist (and be traversable) at check time -- a verified cd cannot fail, so the later segments really do run there. | and || always invalidate the tracked directory: a subshelled or conditionally-skipped cd leaves ./x pointing at a different, untrusted file regardless of the filesystem. cd targets containing variables, substitutions, quotes, or ~ are never trusted.
Bare newlines are treated as command separators (like ;) and each line is checked independently; backslash-newline continuations are joined.
Command substitutions
$(...) substitutions are not executed by the checker. Their inner command text is validated recursively, then replaced with an inert placeholder solely for static matching. So WEEK=$(date +%s); echo $WEEK auto-approves, while echo $(curl http://x) confirms. A substitution used as the command word itself always confirms.
Although shell operators in substitution output are not re-parsed, the output can become command options. Built-in prefixes whose options can write or execute (find, fd, sort, rg, date, selected Git commands, etc.) therefore reject opaque substitution-derived arguments: sort $(echo -o) ... confirms. Custom safe prefixes are treated as an explicit assertion that their complete argument surface is safe; wrappers should enforce their own read-only operation guard, as the Phab search wrapper does. Backticks, unsafe/unbalanced/empty substitutions, and arithmetic expansion $((...)) always confirm.
Configuration
You can customize the allowlist with a nolo.json config file:
- Project-level:
.pi/nolo.json(takes precedence) - Global:
~/.pi/agent/nolo.json
Config format
{
"safePrefixes": ["make build", "docker ps", "kubectl get"],
"dangerousPatterns": ["\\|", "&&", "\\brm\\b"],
"shortcut": "ctrl+shift+y"
}
Merge behavior
safePrefixes— merged (union of defaults + global + project)dangerousPatterns— overridden (project overrides global overrides defaults)shortcut— overridden (project overrides global overrides default)
If no config files exist, the hardcoded defaults are used. See nolo.example.json for the full default configuration.
Example: add custom safe commands
Create .pi/nolo.json in your project:
{
"safePrefixes": ["make build", "docker ps", "kubectl get pods"]
}
These will be added to the defaults — you don't need to re-list the built-in prefixes.
Example: relax dangerous patterns
If you want to allow piped commands (at your own risk):
{
"dangerousPatterns": [
"&&",
"\\|\\|",
";",
"`",
"\\$\\(",
">\\s",
">>",
"\\brm\\b",
"\\bsudo\\b",
"\\beval\\b",
"\\bexec\\b"
]
}
This replaces the defaults entirely, so the \\| (pipe) pattern is no longer checked.
Example: change the YOLO-cycle shortcut
The shortcut field sets the key that cycles YOLO mode. It defaults to
ctrl+y, which collides with pi's built-in tui.editor.yank. To avoid
the conflict without touching pi's keybindings.json, pick another key:
{
"shortcut": "ctrl+shift+y"
}
The shortcut is resolved once when the extension loads, so changes take
effect after a /reload. The /yolo slash command always works
regardless of the configured shortcut.
License
MIT